Fiscal transfers to immigrants in Canada: responding to critics and a revised estimate by Grubel, Herbert & Grady, Patrick
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Fiscal transfers to immigrants in Canada:
responding to critics and a revised
estimate
Herbert Grubel and Patrick Grady
Fraser Institute
6. March 2012
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/37406/
MPRA Paper No. 37406, posted 17. March 2012 03:22 UTC
Studies in  
IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE POLICY
March 2012
Fiscal Transfers to Immigrants  
in Canada: Responding to  
Critics and a Revised Estimate 
by Herbert Grubel and Patrick Grady
Key findings
In 2011, we estimated that in 2005 Canada’s immigrant selection policies 
resulted in an average fiscal burden on taxpayers of $6,000 for each 
immigrant. Later that year, Mohsen Javdani and Krishna Pendakur from 
the economics department at Simon Fraser University (J&P hereafter) 
presented an alternative estimate of this fiscal burden of $450.
This study concludes that J&P’s lower estimate is due mainly to their 
choice of a different immigrant cohort and assumptions about the 
immigrants’ absorption of government spending on pure public goods, 
education, and public housing.
After taking into account some new data and some issues raised by 
J&P, this study presents new estimates that show that the fiscal burden 
imposed by the average recent immigrants is $6,000, which for all 
immigrants is a total of between $16 billion and $23 billion per year, 
figures virtually identical to those found in our earlier study.
This study also rejects arguments made by J&P that immigrants are 
needed to meet labour shortages, that they bring productivity-increasing 
economies of scale, and that their children will repay the fiscal burden. 
New evidence does not provide any grounds for optimism that the 
offspring of recent immigrants are going to be able to earn enough to 
compensate current and future generations of Canadians for the fiscal 
transfers made to their parents by existing Canadians. 
This study also presents new evidence showing that immigrants who 
were admitted mainly on the basis of pre-arranged jobs have superior 
economic performance, which supports the policy recommendation 
made in our 2011 study. 
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Fiscal Transfers to Immigrants in Canada: 
Responding to Critics and a Revised Estimate
Summary
This paper responds to the criticism by Mohsen Javdani and Krishna Pendakur 
of our estimate of the net fiscal transfer to recent immigrants. Specifically, 
Javdani and Pendakur question our estimate that in fiscal year 2005/06 the 
average fiscal burden imposed on Canadian taxpayers was around $6,000 
for each immigrant. They counter with a much lower estimate of $450 per 
immigrant. We welcome this opportunity to explain the differences in these 
estimates and why our original estimate is still the most accurate available 
on the net fiscal cost of recent immigration. 
The difference between the two estimates is due to two main factors. 
First, Javdani and Pendakur used estimates of the incomes of immigrants that 
arrived over the period 1970 to 2004, which were higher than the incomes 
of the 1987 to 2004 immigrant cohort used in our study. Second, they con-
sidered 10% of total government spending to involve “pure public goods” such 
as defence, the consumption of which by immigrants is alleged to occur at 
zero cost to Canadians. 
We reject both of these factors as invalid, the first because it does not 
address the core of our analysis, i.e. the fiscal implications of the low average 
incomes of immigrants who arrived between 1987 and 2004; and the second 
because pure public goods are not quantitatively significant in the longer run. 
After correcting for minor errors in our study pointed out by the critics, 
we found that the net fiscal transfers to recent immigrants remain roughly 
the same—around $6,000 per capita or about $16 billion annually—just as 
we had reported in our original study. We also provide new information that 
rejects the notion that these fiscal costs will be repaid in the future through 
a variety of benefits brought by immigrants and their offspring. Finally, we 
present information about the economic success of immigrants who have 
held job offers, which supports our proposal for using such offers as the main 
immigrant selection criterion.
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Highlights
Mohsen Javdani and Krishna Pendakur (J&P hereafter, 2011) have called into 
question our estimate that the average fiscal burden imposed on Canadian 
taxpayers was around $6,000 for each immigrant and have countered with 
their own much lower estimate of $450. We welcome this opportunity to 
explain the differences in these estimates and why our original estimate is 
still the most accurate available on the net fiscal cost of recent immigration. 
Our critics’ finding that there is a fiscal transfer of $450 implies that 
they accept the most basic propositions underlying our study, namely: In 
the Canadian welfare state, Canadians with higher incomes are taxed more 
than Canadians with lower incomes while government services benefit both 
groups in roughly equal amounts. Under this system, immigrants who add 
to the number of lower income earners force those with higher incomes to 
pay more taxes.
These considerations imply the need for precise estimates of the tax 
increases caused by current immigrant selection policies that have produced 
the low incomes of recent immigrants. Both studies found that immigrants 
have average incomes below the average Canadian, 72 percent according to 
our study, 89 percent according to J&P. This difference is due to the differ-
ent cohorts of immigrants considered—those who arrived between 1987 and 
2004 in our study, and those who arrived between 1970 and 2004 in the J&P 
study.
J&P argued that our use of the 1987-2004 cohort was inappropriate 
because the immigrants tended to be younger than the Canadians with whom 
they were compared. Given the life-cycle of incomes, the average for that 
cohort is alleged to introduce a downward bias that is eliminated by their 
use of the longer cohort.
In the next section we present additional evidence that refutes this 
proposition by comparing the incomes of immigrants and Canadians of the 
same age.
A second source of the lower estimate of the fiscal burden produced by 
J&P stems from their assumption that ten percent of government spending is 
alleged to consist of what economists call “pure public goods” such as defence. 
According to this theory, the benefits from such spending received by every-
one in Canada are not diminished by benefits received by new immigrants. 
We consider this adjustment to be unwarranted since pure public 
goods do not, in all the most important cases, exist in the long run, which 
is relevant in determining the fiscal burden caused by current and future 
immigrants admitted under present selection policies. Instead, almost all 
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government spending, including that on such pure public goods like defence 
is a function of the size of Canada’s population and national income.
A third source of the lower estimate of the fiscal burden by J&P stems 
from their assertion that immigrants on average pay the same amount of real 
estate taxes as do Canadians. This argument is based on a complex and poorly 
explained model, which uses implicit assumptions about the number of per-
sons and family units per housing unit occupied by immigrants as compared 
with the practices of Canadians. 
It also flies in the face of common sense to imply that immigrants in 
large Canadian cities, where most settle, have enough financial resources to 
own homes in the same proportion as Canadians. In another part of their 
paper J&P cite data, which show that recent immigrants use fewer housing 
subsidies than Canadians but neglect to note that in this same study, earlier 
immigrants are recorded as using more such subsidies than Canadians.
A fourth source of difference in the estimates of the fiscal burden in 
the two studies involves the relative use of publicly financed education. J&P 
cite data, which show that immigrants absorb more of these services than 
Canadians, which implies that we had underestimated the size of the fiscal 
transfers going to immigrants. 
After taking these sources of discrepancy into account and correcting 
some small computational errors in our study resulting from inconsistencies 
identified by J&P, we re-estimated the amount of fiscal transfers received by 
recent immigrants. It turns out that, even after all the required adjustments 
in the fiscal year 2005/06, recent immigrants on average received an excess 
of $6,000 in benefits over taxes paid, an amount virtually identical to that 
found in our original study. Depending on assumptions about the number of 
immigrants to which this per capita figure is applied, the estimated total fiscal 
burden in that year remains between $16 and $23 billion as we found before.
In other sections we deal with common arguments repeated by J&P 
that immigrants raise the well-being of Canadians through a number of chan-
nels that cannot be measured in dollars or accrue as fiscal benefits to future 
generations of Canadians. We present analysis and data that sheds serious 
doubt on the existence of such non-measurable and future fiscal benefits. We 
argue that immigrants do not raise labour productivity, are not needed to 
meet labour shortages, and are not subject to discrimination that is respon-
sible for their low productivity that could be ended easily through public 
information. Furthermore, data shows that if the offspring of recent immi-
grants have the same economic success as do the offspring of preceding immi-
grant cohorts, in the future they will not pay enough taxes to cover the costs 
incurred by their immigrant parents.
This paper also reviews a study that is not yet published but has been 
cited by economists who had access to it. This study shows that immi-
grants who were selected on the basis of having pre-arranged job offers have 
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considerably better economic success than immigrants who were selected 
under the previously used system. While this change improves Canada’s 
immigrant selection system, many more changes are needed. Nevertheless, 
the results of the study lend support to our proposal to increase reliance on 
market signals in the selection of immigrants most likely to benefit Canada. 
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Introduction
In our study (Grubel and Grady, 2011—G&G hereafter) we estimate that 
in 2005 Canada’s immigrant selection policies resulted in an average fis-
cal burden on taxpayers of $6,051 for each immigrant. Mohsen Javdani and 
Krishna Pendakur (2011—J&P hereafter) present an alternative estimate of 
this fiscal burden of $450.
We welcome the attention paid to our study by J&P and the clarifica-
tion of a range of issues that it enables us to make. We are also pleased with 
their acknowledgement in their Executive Summary that: “We do conclude, 
however, that there is a sizeable cost in terms of lower tax revenue to having 
a large population of relatively poorly paid immigrants” (2011: 13).  
This statement implies that J&P accept the most fundamental notion 
underlying our study. In our welfare state, Canadians with higher incomes 
are taxed at progressively higher rates than Canadians with lower incomes 
while government services benefit both groups in roughly equal amounts. 
Under this system, immigrants with lower incomes add to the fiscal burden 
of Canadians with higher incomes.1
As a result of the agreement on this fundamental proposition, the dis-
agreement between J&P and ourselves is reduced to what should be the rela-
tively technical task of estimating the most accurate and reliable values of 
the transfers to recent immigrants. These estimate values will provide the 
government with the necessary information on which to base future chan-
ges in immigrant selection policies—changes designed to benefit Canada 
economically.
 1 The net fiscal impact is also recognized as a serious economic issue in the United States. 
In 1997, the National Science Foundation conducted a comprehensive study of immigra-
tion including its fiscal impacts and found a significant net fiscal transfer to immigrants 
(US National Science Foundation, 1997).
2 / Fiscal Transfers to Immigrants in Canada: Responding to Critics and a Revised Estimate
Fraser Institute / www.fraserinstitute.org
                    1  The main cause of the difference in 
estimates
The main reason why the J&P estimate of the fiscal burden is so much lower 
than ours is that they considered the earnings of immigrants who arrived dur-
ing the period 1970-2004, while we focused on those who arrived during the 
more recent period 1987-2004. These are immigrants who performed much 
worse than earlier immigrants for a number of reasons, including their greater 
numbers, their different source countries as well as changes in immigration 
policy that placed less emphasis on employability and more on more difficult 
to measure factors such as educational attainment, knowledge of both lan-
guages, and humanitarian objectives such as family reunification. 
Their inclusion of the earlier, more successful, pre-1987 immigrants in 
the analysis is important because it raises the average incomes and tax pay-
ments of all immigrants and thus reduces the estimated fiscal burden that is 
produced by the group classified as recent immigrants. 
This differential treatment of the 1970 to 1986 cohort of immigrants is 
the reason that the average income of recent immigrants calculated by G&G 
was 72 percent of that of other Canadians while J&P estimated it to be 89 per-
cent. It is worth noting that both estimates were made using the same Public 
Use Microdate File (PUMF) supplied by Statistics Canada, which provides 
demographic information on a representative sample of 844,476 persons. 
Of this total, 64,792 are in the cohort of immigrants who arrived during the 
years 1987-2004 (and who reported income or income tax) and 98,793 are 
in the larger 1970-2004 cohort used by J&P.
J&P justify the use of the larger cohort by arguing that “G&G investi-
gate only recent immigrants, who are younger than the immigrant popula-
tion as a whole. To the extent that their youth results in lower incomes, and 
their lower incomes result in lower tax revenues, it would be more revealing 
to examine the entire immigrant population, so as to capture their entire life 
cycle of incomes” (J&P, 2011: 6). They go on to argue that the immigrants who 
arrived in the 1970-86 period are older, which would eliminate this age bias 
and reflect more accurately the true incomes and tax payments of immigrants. 
We address the issue raised by J&P by estimating that the average age 
of the 1987 to 2004 cohorts of immigrants is 37.1 years.2  This compares with 
 2  Since the PUMF does not include a specific variable for age, the average age had to be 
estimated by using an age group variable attached to each record in the sample. It broke 
the sample into 22 groups. We estimated the age of the individual by taking the average 
Fiscal Transfers to Immigrants in Canada: Responding to Critics and a Revised Estimate / 3
www.fraserinstitute.org / Fraser Institute
the average age of 39.7 of all Canadian residents excluding recent immigrants 
in the sample. In our view, this is not a large enough difference to affect mater-
ially the main estimate of the fiscal burden presented in our original study.
The more fundamental point is that we chose the shorter 1987 to 2004 
period in order to quantify the effects of the surge of immigrants after 1986, 
which is clearly evident from figure 1. After the ramp-up was largely completed 
in 1991, the annual level of immigrants settled was 231,000, much higher than 
the average of 138,000 during the period 1950 and 1986. Moreover, as can 
be seen in figure 1, the annual rates of immigration during the earlier period 
fluctuated widely in response to Canadian business cycles while this sensitiv-
ity is largely absent after 1991.
While it is not relevant to the present analysis, it is worth noting that 
the upsurge in immigration, which had started in 1986, was caused by the 
deliberate decision of Prime Minister Brian Mulroney’s government to bring 
more immigrants into Canada. This decision was justified officially on the 
economic grounds that more immigrants were needed to compensate for 
Canada’s declining birth rate, but according to Windsor (1990) was also driven 
by the political desire to cater to the votes of earlier immigrants interested 
in having family members join them and in enlarging the size of their ethnic 
communities.
Along with the upsurge of immigration after 1986 came a shift in the 
composition of immigrants away from the traditional source countries of 
of the start and end point of the group, excluding those under 15 years and over 64 for 
whom income tax data was not available. For instance, for someone in age group 12 cov-
ering those 40 to 44, their age was estimated as 42.
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Europe and the United States towards non-traditional source countries in the 
developing world. As a result, the share of visible minority immigrants, who 
have had much more difficulty than others competing in the Canadian labour 
market, almost doubled from 38 percent before 1991 to 74 percent after 1991.3
The effects of the surge in immigration after 1986 on the average 
incomes of different cohorts of immigrants has been documented and put 
into historic perspective in a study by Picot and Sweetman (2011), which 
became available only after our study had been completed. Their findings are 
shown in figure 2, which traces the ratio of the earnings of immigrant males 
to those of Canadian males for different cohorts over time. 
The interpretation of this figure is facilitated by considering the top line, 
which shows the average earnings of immigrants from the 1975-1979 cohort 
relative to the earnings of comparable Canadians. During the first five years 
after arrival, this cohort earned about 85 percent of what Canadians earned. 
This percentage increased through time and reached about 98 percent after 
the immigrants had been in Canada for 21-25 years. 
The lines below trace the income percentages for cohorts that arrived 
after 1979. As can be seen, these percentages became smaller for every sub-
sequent cohort during their first five years after arrival and remained so in 
 3  Calculations by the authors from the Census PUMF.
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the later years—except for the 1995-1999 cohort, which had incomes above 
those of the 1990-1994 cohort, perhaps because they arrived when the econ-
omy was strong. However, the first period incomes of the 2000-2004 cohort, 
which the authors indicate were estimated using a model, were only slightly 
above those of the 1990-1994 cohort. It should be noted that similar results 
were found for females.
While this study confirms the downward trend in the economic per-
formance of recent immigrant cohorts that is crucial to our estimate of the 
fiscal burden, it is crucial for another reason. J&P suggest that the low average 
incomes of the 1987-2004 cohort were due to their young ages. The validity of 
this assertion is undermined by the fact that Picot and Sweetman used income 
data that compared “the earnings of immigrants to the Canadian-born with 
similar characteristics (i.e., education, age, marital status, etc.)” (2011: 15). In 
other words, the comparison of earnings involves immigrants and Canadians 
at the same stage in their age-income profile. 
Since the data used by Picot and Sweetman shows a strong and con-
sistent decline in the ratio of the incomes of immigrants and Canadians with 
similar characteristics through time, we believe this supports our view that 
our study is not significantly biased by the alleged younger age of immigrants 
relative to the age of Canadians. As a result, we reject J&Ps suggestion that 
we significantly underestimated the incomes and taxes paid by immigrants. 
In calculations below, we therefore retain the 1987 to 2004 cohort as the 
relevant immigrant group for the purposes of analysis of incomes and taxes.
The data found in figure 2 also sheds light on the question raised often 
in public discussions as to whether immigrants tend to earn the same or even 
more than Canadians after they have been in Canada for a long period. During 
this time they will have likely acquired relevant work and language skills and 
are fully integrated into the labour market. As can be seen from figure 2, the 
ratio of earnings of recent cohorts of immigrants to Canadian-born workers 
does not become equal, even after they have been in Canada 21 to 25 years.
The same figure shows that the maximum ratio after 21 to 25 years is 
reached by immigrants from the 1975-79 cohort, which had much higher 
incomes immediately after arrival in Canada than did later arrival cohorts. 
The 1980-84 cohort, which had lower initial earnings, had lower incomes 
than Canadian-born workers in every comparable period, and after 21 to 25 
years still had lower incomes than the 1975-79 cohort.
These data suggest that the relatively low average incomes of recent 
immigrants will not be eliminated through time. Therefore, the fiscal burden 
they impose will remain, albeit its size should decline the longer the immi-
grants are in Canada—at least until they enter their retirement years. However, 
under the present immigration policies, new immigrants will continue to 
impose the fiscal burden and do so increasingly if their relative numbers 
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increase and their initial and lifetime earnings remain below the Canadian 
average or become even less, as they have in recent years.
While it is not directly relevant to our analysis of the fiscal burden of 
recent immigrants, it is worth noting what Picot and Sweetman consider 
the main causes of declining average incomes of immigrant cohorts dur-
ing the last 30 years. “There was a movement in immigration away from the 
traditional source regions such as Western Europe, the United States, and 
Australia towards Asian, African, and Caribbean countries. A bundle of char-
acteristics that are difficult to disentangle follow from this: notably issues with 
language skills, educational quality, cultural differences, possibly ethnical/
racial discrimination, etc.” (Picot and Sweetman, 2011: 19). Other explana-
tions offered involve developments in Canada’s labour market and changes 
in returns to work experience and occupations like Information Technology.
The findings by Picot and Sweetman are further illuminated by some 
other studies summarized next. They shed light on different aspects of the 
decline in the economic performance of recent immigrants and are relevant to 
the future design of improved immigrant selection policies by the government.
Average incomes before and after 1986:  Statistics Canada
The first of these studies is from Statistics Canada (2003) and shows the 
average incomes of immigrants and Canadian-born workers for different age 
groups by gender. The main finding relevant here is that in 1980 Canadian-
born male workers between the ages of 30 to 54 earned $51,300 while immi-
grant men of the same age who had arrived during the preceding five years 
had earnings of $45,500. The gap in earnings in favour of Canadian-born 
males was $5,800. 
Important for the present purposes of analysis is the fact that the same 
calculation for the year 2000 showed an inflation-adjusted gap of $12,300. 
Similar results exist for females and males at different levels of educational 
attainment, including university graduation. This study shows clearly that 
there has been a significant deterioration in the economic performance of 
immigrants who arrived after the 1986 surge in annual rates of immigration.
The second of these studies, Earnings and Incomes of Canadians over 
the Past Quarter Century, is also from Statistics Canada (2008), and is based 
on the most recent 2006 census. The basis of comparison are immigrant 
earners who arrived in four five-year cohorts between 1975 and 2004 and 
who are in the core working age group (25-54) to those of their Canadian-
born counterparts:
“During the past quarter century, the earnings gap between recent 
immigrants and Canadian-born workers widened significantly... In 1980, 
recent immigrant men... earned 85 cents for each dollar received by Canadian-
born men... the corresponding number was 67 cents in 2000... (and) by 2005, 
the ratio had dropped to 63 cents” (Statistics Canada, 2008:21).
Fiscal Transfers to Immigrants in Canada: Responding to Critics and a Revised Estimate / 7
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Figure 3 provides a visual representation of some other relevant facts 
found in this Statistics Canada study. Considering the last set of bars in the fig-
ure that refer to females without university degrees, the 1980 census showed 
that the average immigrant female earned 86 percent of the amount earned 
by the average Canadian female. In the later censuses of 1990, 2000, and 
2005, these percentage figures declined steadily to only 56 percent in the 
latest census. Similar results for other groupings of immigrants shown in the 
graph reveal the same pattern.
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Figure 3: Ratios of recent immigrant to Canadian-born earnings, census years
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Finally, there is new evidence presented in table 1 on the success of recent 
immigrants in labour markets provided by the Labour Force Survey. This is 
important for two reasons. First, it is the only source we could find that con-
siders the economic performance of immigrants in the most recent period 
since 2008. Second, it shows the extent to which recessions cause the incomes 
of most recent immigrants to fall considerably more than those of Canadians. 
These data are based on a special tabulation done by Statistics Canada 
for the Canadian Labour Congress, which was published in a note by Andrew 
Jackson (2011). 
As can be seen, the average hourly earnings of immigrants who had 
been in Canada five or fewer years in 2010 were $6.30 below those of com-
parable Canadian-born workers. This fact is important because of the claim 
made by Minister of Immigration Jason Kenney that stated that while he con-
siders our earlier estimates of the fiscal burden to have been accurate, recent 
Figure 3: Ratios of recent immigrants to Canadian-born earnings, census years
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changes in admissions criteria have improved the economic performance of 
new immigrants making these estimates obsolete (O’Neil, 2011).
The data also show that by several indicators these recent immigrants 
have been affected much more adversely by the recession than Canadian-
born workers. Thus, between 2008 and 2010 the average hourly earnings of 
recent immigrants in the country less than five years rose by only 6 cents while 
those of Canadian-born workers rose by $1.32. In addition, these very recent 
immigrants experienced a much greater increase in the rate of unemployment 
between the business cycle peak in 2008 and 2010. It rose from 11.0 percent 
to 14.7 percent while that of Canadian-born workers rose only from 4.6 per-
cent to 6.1 percent. The table also shows that these very recent immigrants 
had a considerably worse record than the Canadian-born with respect to 
their employment rates and the proportion who had hourly earnings under 
$20 per hour.
Far from making our estimate of the fiscal burden obsolete or just too 
high, these new data suggest that we may in fact be underestimating it.
Table 1: The labour market performance of recent immigrants and 
the 2008 nancial crisis (age 25-54)
Recent immigrants 
< 5 years
Canadian-born
Unemployment rate  
Employment rate 
Average hourly earnings
Average hourly earnings 
under $20/hour
2010
2008
2010
2008
2010
2008
2010
2008 11.0%
14.7%
66.6%
63.5%
$18.68
$18.74
64.8%
67.1%
$23.72
$25.04
42.9%
37.9%
4.6%
6.1%
84.1%
82.4%
Source: Statistics Canada data, reported in an note by Andrew Jackson on the Centre 
for Policy Alternatives website: 
http://www.behindthenumbers.ca/2011/10/17/recent-immigrants-and-the-crisis/
Table 1: The labour market performance of recent immigrants and 
the 2008 financial crisis (age 25-54)
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                    2  Evaluating the sources of the fiscal 
burden—taxes paid
The preceding analysis should provide sufficient information about the merit 
of each study. However, for those who are interested, the following considers 
in more detail how estimates of different types of tax revenue are affected by 
the methodologies adopted by G&G and J&P.
Table 2 shows the types of per capita taxes collected by all levels of 
government in Canada and for which disagreements between the two stud-
ies exist. Columns 1 and 2 present the amounts by which the payments made 
by other Canadians exceed those made by recent immigrants, as estimated 
by G&G and J&P, respectively. 
Column 3 presents the difference between the two estimates and col-
umn 4 indicates the percentage that each type of tax revenue represents out 
of the sum of the differences shown in column 3.
Turning to a discussion of the differences in estimates found in the 
two studies, we first consider the personal income tax. The gap of payments 
between other Canadians and immigrants estimated by J&P is much smaller 
than that estimated by G&G. The small J&P number is entirely due to their 
use of income data for the 1970-2004 immigrant cohort, which is 89 percent 
of that of other Canadians and is much higher than that for the 72 percent for 
(1) Personal Income Tax 
(2) General Sales Taxes 
(3) Other Taxes 
(4) Corporate Income Taxes 
(5) Property & Related Taxes
Total
2,460
607
669
1,465
960
6,161
1,087
239
263
879
3
 2,471
1,373
368
406
586
957
3,690
G&G J&P 1 minus 2 Dierence
37.2
10.0
11.0
15.9
25.9
100.00
Estimates by Dierence % of Total
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Type of Tax
Table 2: A comparison of estimates of lower revenues paid by recent 
immigrants ($ per capita)
Source: G&G, 2011: 6 and J&P, 2011: 19.
Source: G&G, 2011: 6 and J&P, 2011: 19.
Table 2: A comparison of estimates of lower revenues paid by recent
immigrants ($ per capita)
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the 1987-2004 cohort used by G&G. For reasons outlined above, we do not 
consider the record of immigrants over this longer period to be relevant to 
our study and we find this adjustment to our estimates unjustified. The 37.2 
percent figure in column 4 shows that the disagreement over personal income 
taxes plays a big role in explaining the reduced tax revenues postulated by J&P.
Rows 2 and 3 of table 2 show revenues from General Sales Taxes and 
Other Taxes. For both of these categories, the J&P estimates of the lower pay-
ments made by immigrants than other Canadians are not as low as those made 
by G&G. The explanation of this difference is once again due to the fact that J&P 
used the larger immigrant cohort and the resulting higher incomes of immigrants. 
For reasons presented above, we find unjustified the resultant reduction in the 
gap in tax revenue equal to 21 percent of the total postulated by J&P.
Row 4 shows the revenue estimates for the corporate income tax presented 
in the two studies. As in the case of the other types of taxes discussed above, the 
lower figure by J&P is due to the use of the higher incomes for the cohort they 
chose. For reasons given above, we therefore reject the need to adjust downward 
by $586, or 15.9 percent, our estimate of the gap in tax revenue between other 
Canadians and immigrants.4
Row 5 shows a difference in the estimates in the two studies that represents 
the significant 25.9 percent of the total. This difference is based on the J&P esti-
mate that recent immigrants on average pay virtually the same amount of taxes 
on real estate and other property as do other Canadians, whereas G&G assumed 
that they pay only 41 percent.
In discussing the two estimates it is important to realize that no data on 
real estate holdings by immigrants and other Canadians exist because munici-
pal records do not identify the immigrant status of owners. For this reason, both 
studies used information considered to be relevant, but subject to large margins 
of uncertainty. 
The lower G&G estimate of 41 percent was based on the view that recent 
immigrants primarily from developing countries, on average, have relatively small 
amounts of financial wealth when they arrive and that their low average incomes 
slow their accumulation of assets needed for a down payment and reduce their 
 4 Our estimate of the corporate income taxes paid by immigrants was assumed to have been 
only 20 percent on the grounds that recent immigrants who arrived with few financial assets 
and needed to save for the acquisition of housing were unlikely to hold many common shares. 
However, in an earlier draft of our study, we had concluded that the relevant percentage figure 
was 30. This number was retained in the text but not applied to the calculation. At the end of 
this paper we present new estimates of the fiscal burden made in the light of the J&P analysis, 
which used the 30 percent figure. We consider this figure appropriate but subject to revision 
if and when solid information on share holdings by immigrants becomes available. Such infor-
mation is unlikely to become available soon, however, since records of financial asset holdings 
by banks and other intermediaries contain no information on the relevant background of the 
owners and Statistics Canada has not obtained it directly from Canadian residents.
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ability to service mortgages. As a result, they are likely to rent apartments or buy 
lower priced homes. This is especially the case since 80 percent of immigrants 
have settled in Canada’s major cities—Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver—where 
housing costs and real estate taxes are very high by both national and inter-
national standards.
In addition, taxes on housing paid by immigrants per capita are likely to 
be low because, in order to afford any housing at all, immigrants are much more 
likely than other Canadians to share homes with relatives or other immigrant 
families. For this reason the taxes paid per capita are lowered correspondingly, 
even if the housing is owned and taxes are paid by an immigrant.
J&P used data on the value of housing in different metropolitan areas 
found in the 2006 census and used information about the share of immigrants in 
each area to infer the amount of value of real estate held and the real estate taxes 
paid by them. A similar approach was used to infer the amount of taxes paid by 
renters. They used a complex and poorly explained statistical algorithm to arrive 
at the dubious conclusion that the average recent immigrant pays virtually the 
same amount of real estate taxes as does the average Canadian (99.8 percent). 
Their results are based on the fact that immigrants tend to settle in big 
cities, where real estate prices and taxes are much higher than the average in the 
rest of the country, while relatively few live in other parts of the country where 
taxes are low. As a result, the average real estate taxes paid by the immigrants 
living mainly in these big cities are so high that they are equal to the average 
paid by other Canadians in the big city and the rest of Canada combined. 
While we have great respect for the statistical and econometric skill of 
J&P, we remain skeptical of their results.  Do their calculations adequately reflect 
the tendency of immigrant families to share accommodations with different 
generations and other groups?  Furthermore, immigrants in 2001 account for 
about 18 percent of the total population of Canada but 43.7 and 37.5 percent 
of the population in Toronto and Vancouver, respectively.  We would like to see 
the detailed calculation, which leads them to the conclusion that the average of 
the high taxes paid by Canadians in the big cities and the low taxes in the rest of 
the country combined equals the average of the high taxes paid by immigrants 
in the big cities. What was the assumed level of taxes paid by Canadians and 
the immigrants in the large cities?  How much lower are the average taxes they 
assumed to being paid by Canadians in the rest of the country? 
Nevertheless, since there are large margins of uncertainty with respect 
to this issue, we have raised our estimates from 41 to 70 percent. As a result, 
in table 2, the figure found in column 1, line 5 should be $488 rather than 
$960. The difference of $472 due to this adjustment implies that the overall 
fiscal burden imposed on other Canadians through their lower tax payment 
falls from $6,161 to $5,689, a drop of 7.7 percent. We also use the 70 percent 
figure in our new estimate of the fiscal burden based on a number of other 
revisions that are found below.
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                    3  Government benefits consumed
Both studies assumed that for 11 out of 15 categories of government spend-
ing found in official data, immigrants and other Canadians received the same 
amount of benefits. This is because of the lack of information on spending on 
recent immigrants in these categories. For one category, Labour, Employment, 
and Immigration, the estimates differ by an insignificant amount. There are 
major disagreements with J&P only over the three spending categories shown 
in table 3 of our original study on the relative amounts of benefits received 
by immigrants and other Canadians.5 
The first of these concerns: “Protection of Persons and Property.” G&G 
assumed that immigrants receive $383 less than other Canadians in these 
benefits on the grounds that immigrants’ incomes are only 72 percent of 
those of other Canadians. J&P’s estimates are $233 justified by assuming 
that immigrants’ incomes were 89 percent of other Canadians according to 
their study of the 1970-2004 cohort. Their specific adjustment if adopted by 
us would actually increase the fiscal burden imposed by immigrants slightly, 
but since we consider the use of the longer cohort to be inappropriate for our 
purposes of analysis, we reject the revision suggested by J&P.
The second category of government spending is Education. G&G 
assumed that immigrants consumed 9 percent more, or $242 per capita, of 
education spending than other Canadians, mainly on the grounds that many 
of the school-age children of immigrants require special language training 
and attention to other special needs. Moreover, many adult immigrants take 
advantage of special programs of instruction involving English and French 
as second languages. J&P used the 2006 census data to estimate the propor-
tion of children in the 1970-2004 immigrant cohort that attended Canadian 
elementary and secondary schools. They found that these children were only 
76 percent of the children of Canadian residents, which implies that the cost 
of schooling immigrant children at that level was less than that for Canadians. 
However, they also discovered that the proportion of children from that immi-
grant cohort attending postsecondary education was 117 percent of that of 
Canadians. Combining these percentage figures with estimates of the cost 
of the appropriate levels leads J&P to conclude that immigrants receive $195 
less per capita in education services than do other Canadians. 
However, J&P also found that for the 1987-2004 immigrant cohort, the 
attendance of immigrant children in these institutions is above that for other 
 5  See G&G, Immigration and the Welfare State, 2011: 9.
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Canadians and implies that they consume on average $671 more. In table 7 
below we use this information in the preparation of our revised estimates.
The third category in table 3 concerns Housing. G&G assumed that 
immigrants consumed 10 percent more of the benefits from this government 
spending than do other Canadians based on the consideration that the low 
average incomes of recent immigrants create a greater than average need for 
subsidized housing. J&P assumed that immigrants used only 90 percent of 
these government services. They justified this figure by referencing a study 
by Fleury (2009), which found that in 2004, “only 20.4 percent of recent 
low-income immigrants used subsidized housing, while this number is 22.5 
percent for low-income native Canadians” (J&P, 2011: 23). 
However, J&P did not tell the full story. Here is the part of a table on 
which their quoted sentence is based:
(1) Protection of persons 
      and property
(2) Education 
(3) Housing
Total
-383
242
15
-126
G&G J&P 1 minus 2 Dierence
Estimates by Dierence % of Total
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Types of Benets
Table 3: Benets received by immigrants and other Canadians
Source: G&G, 2011: 9 and J&P, 2011: 24.
-100
190
10
100
-233
437
29
233
-150
-195
-14
-359
Government or other 
subsidy for rent
Table 4: Housing data cited by J&P
Low-income adults Earlier immigrantsRecent immigrants
Native-born 
Canadians
22.5% 38.4%20.4%
Source: Fleury (2007), Table 15.
Table 3: Benefits received by immigrants and other Canadians
Table 4: Housing data cited by J&P
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Referring to this table, Fleury notes: “It is nonetheless interesting to 
observe that poor immigrants who are more established and who were rent-
ers were more likely to live in subsidized housing” (2009: Section 11). We 
find it strange that J&P, who in other areas of their study insist on the need 
to consider the conditions of earlier immigrants, completely disregard this 
finding in the Fleury study. 
More generally, we are at a loss to explain the difference between the 
use of housing subsidies by recent and earlier immigrants found by Fleury, 
especially since the poverty rates among recent immigrants are much higher 
than those for earlier immigrants shown in figure 4. There are a number of 
questions raised by the Fleury study. Are the lower rates of use by more recent 
immigrants due to their relative lack of information about the availability of 
housing subsidies? Where do immigrants live during the early years after 
arrival?  Do they mainly live with other immigrants in over-crowded housing 
owned by other immigrants?  If so, what is the implication for the per capita 
real estate taxes by the average immigrant?
In sum, the preceding analysis leads us to the conclusion that there is 
no need for any adjustment to our estimates of the amount of government 
services consumed by recent immigrants in the 1987-2004 cohort relative 
to that consumed by Canadians. Therefore in table 6 below we use the pre-
viously employed 110 percent figure to estimate the dollar value of housing 
expenditures absorbed by recent immigrants.
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Figure 4: Percentage of immigrants below LICO, 2005 Census
Source: Statistics Canada, Earnings and Income over the Past Quarter Century, 2006 Census, Catalogue 97-563 X.   
Figure 4: Percentage of immigrants below LICO, 2005 Census
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                    4  Using a different base for 
comparison
The PUMF data base allows Canadians to be put into five different groups:6
(1) All Canadians = (2)+(3)+(4)
(2) Recent Immigrants (arrived during the period 1987-2004)
(3) Persons born in Canada
(4) Non-recent immigrants (arrived before 1987)
(5) All other Canadians minus recent immigrants = (1) minus (2)
In our study we expressed the incomes and tax payments of group 
(2), containing 64,792 records, as a percentage of the incomes and tax pay-
ments of group (1), which contains 692,509 records.7  J&P pointed out that 
we should have used group (3), not group (1), for comparison. They are right 
that we did not use the correct group, but, given that our focus is on recent 
immigrants, the correct group is actually (5), not (3) , which includes 627,458 
records. We were aware of this in preparing our study, but we did not make 
this calculation since we judged that it would have complicated the analysis 
and exposition. However, in response to the criticism by J&P we accept that 
we did not use exactly the right group for comparison and now use group 
(5), which in our view is most appropriate, as the base for comparison with 
group (2) in table 5.8
As table 6 and other calculations below show, this adjustment raises 
the estimated gap between taxes paid by recent immigrants and the rest from 
$5,486 to $5,739, or $253. As a result, our estimated total fiscal burden per 
immigrant is increased by this same amount.
 6 There is also a small non-permanent resident category which for the purposes of simpli-
city is included with non-recent immigrants.
 7 This is smaller than the total number in the PUMF database because it excludes those for 
whom income and income tax data was not available or not applicable, which is applied 
to all persons less than 15 years of age.
 8 While this somewhat complicates the calculations, it has the advantage of dividing  all 
resident Canadians into two groups and thus can be used to similarly allocate all taxes 
and expenditures between the two groups. 
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                    5  Revised estimates
The next three tables present our revised estimates of the basic data on 
incomes and income taxes paid (table 5), the distribution of taxes paid (table 
6), and government spending (table 7). The differences between our original 
and the new estimates are discussed above in some detail.
Table 6 shows data that provide the main basis for our findings that 
recent immigrants impose a substantial fiscal burden on all Canadians. The 
last column indicates key estimates of the differences in the amount of taxes 
paid by all Canadians (minus recent immigrants) and the taxes paid by 
recent immigrants for the different types of taxes collected by all Canadian 
governments.
Table 7 shows the benefits received by recent immigrants through 
expenditures by all levels of government.
The bottom line of our original and revised estimates is found in the 
calculation of the fiscal transfer imposed by the average recent immigrant, 
using the formula: 
FT = (To – Ti) + (Gi – Go)
Where FT is the average per capita fiscal transfer, 
T is the average per capita taxes paid,
G is the average per capita benefit received through program spending
Subscript o denotes “other Canadians” 
Subscript i denotes recent immigrants
In our original study the numbers were:
FT = ($16,501 – $10,340) + ($15,797 – $15,907) = $6,161 - $110 = $6,051
Based on the new numbers:
FT = ($17,372 - $11,299) + ($16,138 - $15,882) = $6,073 + $256 = $6,329
As can be seen, the annual fiscal burden imposed by the average recent 
immigrant on the taxpayers of Canada in our new estimate is $6,329, or $278 
more than we had estimated it to be in our original study. This increase is 
largely due to the use of information on higher enrolment of immigrant chil-
dren in educational institutions supplied by J&P and by the use of the more 
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appropriate population base (excluding recent immigrants arriving between 
1987 and 2004) with which recent immigrants are compared.
The figure of $6,329 average annual per capita fiscal transfer from 
other Canadians to recent immigrants can be put into some perspectives 
that should enter into any public discussions and government decisions about 
changes to existing immigration policies. 
First, if the average immigrant pays taxes and receives benefits for 45 
years between his or her arrival and end of life, every recent immigrant bene-
fits from transfers worth $284,805, disregarding all effects of discounting 
and inflation. 
Second, during the 18-year period from 1987 to 2004, a total of 3.9 mil-
lion immigrants arrived in Canada. In 2006 they would have imposed a cost 
of $24.7 billion if none of the immigrants had emigrated, died, or returned 
to their native countries. However, because of these factors, of those 3.9 mil-
lion immigrants only 2.7 million still remained in Canada. The annual fiscal 
subsidies to these remaining immigrants in 2006 were $17 billion.
Between 2005 and 2010 approximately another 1.5 million immigrants 
arrived in Canada. Assuming that their numbers were not changed by mor-
tality and other factors and that their economic record is the same as that of 
the 1987-2004 cohort, in the year 2011, they will have added another $9.5 
billion to the $17 billion noted above, for a total of $26 billion.
In sum, our new estimates that were made in response to criticisms 
made by J&P are virtually the same as those made in our first study. They thus 
confirm the validity of our most basic findings: Canada’s immigrant selec-
tion policies result in the imposition of a significant fiscal burden on taxpayers, 
including past immigrants, which will continue to grow, reduce living stan-
dards, and hamper economic growth unless the existing policies are changed. 
Our original study presents the principle on which such changes should 
be based:  Remove the creation and administration of admissions criteria from 
the responsibility of politicians and civil servants and shift them to the private 
sector. That sector should be able to select immigrants productive enough 
to earn the minimum salary set by government with the goal of having them 
pay for the government services they consume. The considerations found 
in our original study suggest that it should be possible to work out such a 
policy without encountering any serious or fundamental problems, though 
the details of such a new policy will have to be developed in consultations 
among governments, the general public who pay taxes, and stakeholders.
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(1)  Immigrants 1987-2004
(5) All Canadians minus
      recent immigrants
(1)/(5)
$25,396
$36,288
70.0%
Average 
income
Table 5: Income and taxes paid by recent immigrants and non-recent immigrants 
including native born Canadians in 2005
Source: Calculations by authors for recent immigrants and non-recent immigrants done from Census 2006 PUMF 
(Statistics Canada, 2009). Total income is provided by the variable “totinc” in the le, and income tax by the variable 
“inctax”, both of which are averaged across individuals to calculate averages. All recent immigrants and Canadians 
reporting income or income tax were included in the sample. 
Average 
employment 
income
Average 
income 
tax paid
Number of ob-
servations in 
sample
64,792
627,458
$3,438
$6,319
54.4%
$21,267
$26,890
79.1%
Personal income taxes
Health & social insurance 
levies
General sales taxes
Corporate taxes
Property & related taxes
Other taxes and revenues
Total
173,435
84,193
69,461
56,293
46,081
101,142
530,605
(2)
$ millionsType of tax
Table 6: Taxes paid by Canadian and recent immigrants, all levels of government, 2005/06
Note: The total taxes paid include those paid by recent immigrants. The dollars per capita gures paid all Canadians minus recent immigrants were calcu-
lated taking into account the ratio of taxes paid by recent immigrants so that the sum of the dollars paid by the two groups weighted by their share of 
the population equals the total taxes paid. Personal income taxes include taxes on payments to non-residents. Health & social insurance levies include 
payroll taxes. Corporate taxes include capital taxes, and natural resource licenses and fees. Property and related taxes exclude capital taxes. Other taxes 
and revenues include all other revenues except for the sales of goods and services, which amounted to $42,966. The total consolidated government rev-
enues reported by Statistics Canada including the sales of goods and services totals $573,571 million in the 2006 scal year. Per capita components may 
not add to the totals because of separate rounding. 
(3)
Percentage 
of total 
revenue
(4)
Dollars per 
capita for all 
Canadians
(4a)
Dollars per 
capita for all 
Canadians 
minus recent 
immigrants
(5)
Tax paid by 
recent 
immigrants as 
% of all 
Canadians 
minus recent 
immigrants
34.7
16.8
13.1
11.1
9.9
14.4
100
5,486
2,663
2,197
1,781
1,458
3,199
16,784
5,739
2,633
2,263
1,910
1,501
3,295
17,372
54.4
100
70
30
70
70
N/A
Source: Statistics Canada, 2010; calculations by authors.     
(1) (6)
Dollars per 
capita paid by 
recent
 Immigrants
3,122
2,663
1,584
573
1,051
2,306
11,299
(7)
Dierence  in 
per-capita tax 
paid: (6) - (4a)
-2,617
0
-679
-1,337
-451
-989
-6,073
Table 6: Taxes paid by Canadian and recent immigrants, all levels of government, 2005/2006
Table 5: Income and taxes paid by recent immigrants and non-recent 
immigrants including native born Canadians in 2005
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Table 7: Benets received by Canadians and recent immigrants, all levels of government, 2005/06
General government services
Protection of persons and 
property
Health
Social Sevices
Education
       Elementary and secondary
       education
       Postsecondary education
       Special retaining services
       Other education
Recreation and culture
Labour, employment, and 
immigration
Housing
Regional planning and 
development
Transportation and 
communication
Resource conservation and 
industrial development
Environment
Foreign aairs and 
international assistance
Research establishments
Other expenditures
Total
(2)
Total 
expenditure 
($ millions)
(3)
Per-capita 
benets 
received by all 
Canadians
(3a)
Dollars per 
capita for all 
Canadians 
minus recent 
immigrants
(4)
Benets 
received by 
recent immi-
grants as % of 
(3a)
(5)
Per-capita 
benets 
received by 
recent immi-
grants ($)
(6)
Dierence in 
per capita 
benets 
(5) - (3a)
20, 074 635 635 635100 0
43,299
99,531
164,568
47,134
32,887
3,598
1,140
14,268
2,480
4,527
2,235
24,838
19,760
13,158
5,585
1,859
1,738
502,680
1,370
3,150
5,208
1,491
1,041
114
36
452
78
143
71
786
625
416
177
59
55
15,907
1,411
3,150
5,208
1,472
997
114
36
452
77
144
71
786
625
416
177
59
55
15,882
70
100
100
113
146
100
100
100
120
110
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
988
3,150
5,208
1,663
1,456
114
36
452
92
158
71
786
625
416
177
59
55
16,138
Note: Spending categories for which the immigrants are estimated to receive lower or higher benets are shown (e.g., Protection of persons and property). Per capita 
components may not add to the totals because of separate rounding.
Source: Statistics Canada, 2010; calculations by authors.
(1)
Category of 
Benet
-423
0
0
191
459
0
0
0
15
14
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
256
Table 7: Benefits r ceived by Canadian and rec nt immigra ts, all levels of government, 2 05/2006
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                    6  Other disagreements on the 
influence of immigrants on Canada
J&P include in their criticism a number of issues that in our experience are 
raised frequently by advocates of immigration and supporters of the current 
immigrant selection process. The following presents our reasons for disput-
ing the merit of several types of allegations they made about the costs caused, 
and contributions made, of immigrants to the Canadian economy and the 
well-being of all Canadians.
J&P obtained their unrealistically low estimate of $450 for the total 
fiscal transfer by arguing that government spending on what is called “pure 
public goods” should not be considered a benefit received by immigrants for 
which they should be expected to pay. Using this argument they lower their 
estimate of the fiscal burden by $1,692, a very large sum which is not reflected 
in our calculations above. Since it involves an aspect of government spend-
ing that was not specifically addressed in our original study as it was not 
considered relevant, it was not included in the preceding section, where the 
focus was on other more concrete and reconcilable differences in estimates 
that appear in government spending and taxation statistics. 
Because of the quantitative significance of the public goods adjust-
ment made by J&P, however, it is useful to discuss the different views on the 
nature of public goods held by J&P and ourselves. According to basic eco-
nomic theory, pure public goods involve spending that creates benefits, which 
accrue to the population as a whole. The most commonly cited example is 
spending on defence. According to the theory used by J&P, immigrants do 
not cause defence spending to rise and it is therefore not appropriate to con-
sider any part of the cost of defence to be a benefit received by immigrants. 
There are very few other examples of pure public goods spending, the 
most important of which is from basic research in natural and health sciences 
the results of which, by their very nature, cannot be patented. The benefits to 
Canadians—and the entire world—are not diminished by the arrival of immi-
grants. J&P cite studies by other economists, which argue that about 5 to 15 
percent of all government spending is on such alleged pure public goods. In 
their calculation they assumed that 10 percent of government spending is on 
pure public goods, even though the Canadian study they cited provided an 
estimate of only 4.4 percent (Akbari, 1989).
We disagree with the position taken by J&P on the nature of pure 
public goods for the analytical purposes at hand. While it is true that in the 
short run spending on pure public goods, like defence, is not increased by 
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population increases; in the longer run, like the period considered, spending 
on such pure public goods is a function of the size of Canada’s population 
and national income. 
To illustrate our view on the nature of pure public goods in the longer 
run, we consider it inconceivable that if Canada’s national income and popu-
lation were half of what they are today, the absolute level of military spending 
would be the same. We postulate that it would more likely be half of what it 
is today.
In support of this proposition we note that NATO, at the insistence of 
the United States, has been measuring the contribution of allies to the com-
mon defence in relation to GDP or in per capita terms, instead of setting 
targets for absolute levels (Congressional Budget Office, 2001). In national 
public and political discussions of current and past defence spending, refer-
ence always is to percentages of national income or total government program 
spending. Spending on other pure public goods like research and develop-
ment and some health policies is also subject to similar considerations, espe-
cially when international organizations discuss the appropriate amount of 
spending by individual nations.
We also note that there is much government spending that does not 
involve pure public goods but that has important public goods aspects, such 
as spending on health, education, and even public protection. The costs to 
Canadians resulting from such spending are increased because immigrants 
impose above-normal costs. 
This effect arises, for example, from the need facing teachers and school 
boards to spend more per immigrant student to meet their needs for language 
training and help with acculturation; from the need facing law enforcement 
agents to deal with ethnic gangs in some urban centres; and from the need 
facing health care providers to deal with immigrants that have had little mod-
ern health care in their native countries. 
  We do not adjust our estimates of the fiscal burden of immigrants to 
account for these costs of immigrants because they are impossible to meas-
ure even approximately, but merely mention them here to suggest that they 
should be considered as an offset to the reduction in the costs of spending on 
pure public goods that is suggested by J&P and that may exist in the short run. 
In support of the preceding analysis we note that the economic theory 
literature on pure public goods is very similar to that on the existence of zero 
marginal cost found in many industries such as transportation and enter-
tainment. When a theatre is not sold out or a bus is not full, admitting more 
users is virtually without additional costs. Given the fundamental economic 
theorem that welfare is maximized if the prices in an economy are equal to 
the marginal cost of production, customers should be admitted without a 
charge. Of course, this policy is not in effect for theatres and buses for the 
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practical reason that few people would buy tickets knowing that they could 
use the service at no cost once the show starts or the bus leaves.
Labour market discrimination
According to J&P, existing evidence suggests that recent immigrants are 
more productive and would earn higher incomes if Canadian employers did 
not discriminate in their hiring and compensation policies and if they prop-
erly recognized the value of educational attainment from varying countries. 
Therefore, if these societal obstacles to the economic success of recent immi-
grants were removed, the fiscal burden would be reduced or eliminated. J&P 
conclude that “Policy proposals to reduce the immigration level...are in fact 
ignoring the problem (of discrimination and underutilization) rather than 
trying to solve it” (2011: 34).
We are, of course, all in favour of policies that improve the productiv-
ity and pay of recent immigrants, but with some qualifications.
J&P are clearly optimistic that recent immigrants are not really less pro-
ductive than other Canadians but that their poor economic records are due 
to the discrimination and ignorance of Canadian employers. They argue that 
immigrant earnings could be raised by a simple and cheap campaign to edu-
cate employers rather than costly investments in language and skills training.
In support of the role played by the discrimination and ignorance on 
part of Canadian employers, J&P provide the results of a study which dis-
tributed 6,000 fake, identical resumes to potential employers. It found that 
those with English sounding names had a 40 percent higher callback rate than 
those with Chinese, Indian, or Pakistani names, which in J&P’s view proves 
the existence of discrimination and ignorance among Canadian employers.
However, there is also another, more likely explanation of the main 
result of this study, which they fail to entertain. It is that many Canadian 
employers have experience hiring people from different ethnic backgrounds, 
which showed that recent immigrants with Chinese, Indian, and Pakistani 
names on average have poorer language (or other) skills that hamper their 
productivity. That these language deficiencies are beyond dispute is evidenced 
by the existence of substantial and costly government programs designed to 
relieve them. 
Until such deficiencies are eliminated—and that is a never-ending job 
under present immigrant selection policies which brings in large numbers 
of new immigrants every year suffering from the same handicaps—it is easy 
to understand why potential employers avoid the cost of interviewing job 
applicants that are likely to have language deficiencies and go for applicants 
that do not. These labour market practices involve rational decision mak-
ing, not discrimination based on socially repulsive motives. This interpreta-
tion of the results of the study using fake resumes also implies that the lower 
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productivity of recent immigrants cannot be eliminated simply by getting rid 
of discrimination and ignorance among employers.
Similar conditions exist with respect to the quality of educational 
achievements of recent immigrants from these countries. At a recent 
Vancouver meeting, Jason Kenney, Canada’s Minister of Immigration,  noted 
that his staff is reviewing the merit of the existing points system used for the 
selection of immigrants. One aspect of the present policy that he identified 
as an issue of special concern is that the same number of points is given to 
an applicant who has a university degree from Harvard as to one who has a 
degree from a small, obscure university in a developing country.9  
These considerations imply that employer reluctance to hire graduates 
with first and professional degrees from universities in developing countries 
may be motivated more by rational considerations rather than by discrimina-
tion based on ethnicity. This conclusion is qualified because professional asso-
ciations have the power given to them by governments to raise the incomes 
of their members by setting standards so high that the supply of accredited 
practitioners is reduced. 
It is difficult to know the extent to which the exclusion of professionals 
with foreign training in today’s Canada is responsible for the small number of 
immigrants admitted to the professions. After all, in recent times the scarcity 
of many professionals, especially in the field of medicine, has created public 
pressures to modify admissions criteria. At any rate, the appropriateness of 
current professional standards will undoubtedly be examined in the context 
of the government’s announced efforts to evaluate objectively the quality of 
professional training provided by many foreign institutions of higher learn-
ing in developing countries. 
We support this effort if it does not cost too much and is effective. But 
we also stress that the need for it would be diminished greatly if the govern-
ment were to adopt our proposed reforms to the existing immigrant selec-
tion policies, which would make it in the interest of the potential employer 
to evaluate properly the competence and economic prospect of candidates 
applying for immigration visas. 
But if J&P are instead proposing an expansion of employment equity 
programs, we are adamantly opposed. It makes no sense to us to bring people 
 9 Grubel, in 1976, taught finance to undergraduates for a year at the University of Nairobi 
under an international assistance program financed by the Canadian International 
Development Agency. His experience shows clearly that the competence of the average 
undergraduate of the University of Nairobi was much lower than the average under-
graduate from Yale, Stanford, the University of Chicago, the University of Pennsylvania, 
or Simon Fraser University, where he also taught. Chances are that this difference has 
not changed much since 1976. 
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into the country and to give them preferences in hiring over other Canadians 
who have the same or superior qualifications for the job, but are rejected 
because they do not qualify for preferential treatment under employment 
equity legislation. We believe that revamping the immigrant selection process 
to avoid the need for affirmative action in the future is a superior alterna-
tive to its use. Affirmative action programs only stoke the resentment of the 
broader community, which does not like to see new immigrants getting pre-
ferment over other Canadians, and will lead to an undesired backlash against 
immigrants.
Economies of scale in labour markets
J&P cite a number of theoretical studies which show that, in principle, the 
hiring of immigrant workers results in higher productivity and living stan-
dards through increased specialization of production and the variety of out-
put. In the economics literature, such benefits are considered to arise from 
economies of scale (the more of a good is produced, the lower the cost of 
production) and economies of scope (the larger a market for a good, the more 
variety of it can be produced at low cost).
We disagree that immigrants are needed to reap the benefits from 
economies of scale and scope because, in today’s world of free trade and 
low costs of transportation and communication, these benefits are already 
available to Canadian producers through exports and to consumers through 
imports. The high incomes of countries like Switzerland and Germany are 
associated with high levels of trade relative to national income while immi-
gration has been small relative to the size of their population.
J&P also refer to literature that suggests that lower wages of immigrants 
result in lower prices for consumers. Again, these benefits are questionable 
in a world of free trade, where prices for consumer goods are determined 
abroad and established in Canada through trade. The prices of non-traded 
services are ultimately related to those of traded goods through the cost of 
labour used in both industries.
J&P also raise the argument that highly-skilled immigrants increase 
the productivity of unskilled Canadian-born workers by providing proper 
supervision and management. The magnitude of any such benefits is open to 
question, given the low quality of many of the allegedly highly-skilled immi-
grants referred to above and the large number of immigrants with low skills 
that need supervision. Moreover, there is no doubt that in the absence of 
immigration the excellent system of higher education in Canada is capable 
of producing all the skilled workers needed for the proper supervision and 
management of Canadian-born workers with low skills. 
J&P also note studies that found increased bilateral trade between 
Canada and countries from which immigrants have come. However, we doubt 
that this effect can possibly be large for exports, given that over three-quarters 
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of Canada’s exports went to the United States over the period in question 
and natural resources provided the bulk of non-US exports. It is difficult to 
envision that the efforts of immigrants from China and India do much, if 
anything, to increase the sale in these countries of Canadian lumber, cop-
per, oil and gas, and even the Canadian manufactured machinery used in 
these industries. It is thus not surprising that the two main studies available 
confirm this view, finding that the increase in trade resulting from immigra-
tion was not only very small but consisted mainly of an increase in imports 
of consumer items from the newcomers’ countries of origin and therefore 
had a negative effect on our balance of trade (Head and Reis, 1998; Partridge 
and Furtan, 2008).
At the same time, J&P fail to mention a significant negative economic 
effect that arises from the continued relationships between immigrants in 
Canada and their families in their home countries. These immigrants regu-
larly send abroad large remittances that cause downward pressures on the 
exchange rate and make imports more expensive for consumers in Canada. 
Generational benefits
J&P argue that our estimate of the fiscal burden imposed by recent immi-
grants neglects the fact that their offspring will not only repay some or all 
of the costs imposed on the current generation of Canadians but also could 
provide net benefits for the current and future generations combined. They 
cite sophisticated theoretical studies, the latest of which concludes that the 
overall fiscal impact of immigration is unclear and depends on the amount 
of pure public goods in government spending.
We have already expressed above our skepticism about the existence 
and quantitative significance of pure public goods in the longer run. We are 
also skeptical about the ability of largely unverified theoretical models to 
provide reliable information about the real world. After all, the conclusions 
from theoretical models are determined by assumptions, which in turn can 
be chosen to produce any conclusions desired by the analyst.
For these reasons, we introduce here empirical information that sheds 
light on the actual economic performance of second-generation immigrants 
who are the children of immigrants who were born in Canada.10  
Table 8 shows the average earnings in the year 2005 for second-gener-
ation immigrants, broken down by different countries of origin, for men and 
women, and by different levels of educational attainment.11
 10  The children of immigrants who were born abroad are known as being 1.5 generation 
offspring and are not included in this tabulation.
 11  More detailed analysis of the performance of second-generation immigrants providing 
information on numbers and average employment earnings by age is provided in Grady 
(2011).
26 / Fiscal Transfers to Immigrants in Canada: Responding to Critics and a Revised Estimate
Fraser Institute / www.fraserinstitute.org
Table 8: Average employment income of immigrants and non-immigrants in 2005 by gender ($)
2nd generation 
immigrants men
Chinese
South Asian
Black
Filipino
Latin American
Southeast Asian
Arab
West Asian
Korean
Japanese
Visible minority n.i.e.
Multiple visible minority
Total visible minority
Not a visible minority
Total non-immigrant
Vis. Min./Non Imm.
2nd generation 
immigrants women
Chinese
South Asian
Black
Filipino
Latin American
Southeast Asian
Arab
West Asian
Korean
Japanese
Visible minority n.i.e.
Multiple visible minority
Total visible minority
Not a visible minority
Total non-immigrant
Vis. Min./Non Imm.
Certicate or 
diploma below 
Bachelors
University 
certicate 
or degree
Bachelor’s 
degree
University certicate, 
diploma or degree
above Bachelors Total
23,867
19,425
20,264
20,360
19,837
13,800
23,475
17,805
19,769
32,002
24,026
19,699
21,080
39,897
36,946
57.1
58,745
49,474
44,365
38,338
36,234
35,984
57,956
38,373
51,959
64,895
58,111
51,838
52,495
82,960
78,673
66.7
51,732
42,604
41,705
36,239
34.678
31,754
58,717
32,701
47,652
55,218
44,438
46,509
46,583
75,970
71,565
65.1
80,165
64,214
52,052
48,726
N/A
48,050
56,442
N/A
63,521
86,730
N/A
65,744
68,542
95,585
92,544
74.1
37,126
27,916
23,808
23,702
21,328
17,207
31,604
23,400
31,893
42,176
28,980
27,299
29,234
49,587
44,076
66.3
18,839
15,244
16,768
17,245
13,417
11,683
15,867
13,111
14,698
21,830
17,431
15,296
16,491
25,814
23,673
69.7
42,623
35,514
35,429
34,489
31,078
32,980
33,225
35,438
33,623
39,647
34,832
35,663
37,687
47.073
45,612
82.6
39,889
32,023
32,680
34,366
28,910
29,350
31,167
34,131
32,072
37,749
32,777
32,609
35,116
43,152
41,690
84.2
51,943
42,870
43,137
35,067
37,573
42,868
38,541
N/A
37,166
44,575
41,363
44,603
44,881
55,120
54,770
81.9
29,009
22,445
21,351
21,845
15,814
15,763
20,488
19,548
24,107
28,146
22,044
21,057
23,354
31,318
28,204
82.8
Source: Grady (2011), using data from Statistics Canada tabulations on website.
Table 8: Average empl yment income of immigrants and no -immigrants 
in 2005 by gender ($)
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The table shows immigrants who are officially considered to belong to 
a “visible minority” and those who do not. The latter group are mainly from 
the United States and Europe, which account for a small and declining share 
of recent immigrants.
As can be seen in table 8, for the lowest level of education, the average 
incomes of visible minority second-generation males is 57.1 percent of the 
average incomes of Canadian-born males. It is 74.1 percent for those with 
a degree above the bachelor’s. For intermediate levels of education the per-
centage figures are in the mid-sixties. The second half of table 8 shows cor-
responding figures for females, which across all levels of education are higher 
than those for males. The incomes of immigrant females with a bachelor’s 
degree average 84.2 percent of Canadian-born counterparts. 
It is interesting to note that across all categories in the table, the 
incomes of second-generation immigrants that do not belong to a visible 
minority are well above those of the Canadian-born in each category. We 
have not examined the good economic performance of non-visible-minority 
immigrants and look forward to future investigations of the issue.
Noteworthy are also significant differences in the earnings of second-
generation immigrants by countries. Those from Japan and China domin-
ate in all categories. Research is needed to explain this fact and differences 
among other countries.
Unfortunately, the data in table 8 on the economic performance of the 
second-generation offspring of recent immigrants certainly does not provide 
any grounds for optimism that the offspring of recent immigrants are going 
to be able to earn enough to compensate current and future generations of 
Canadians for the fiscal transfers made to their parents by existing Canadians.
Of course, it is still possible that later generations of offspring of recent 
immigrants will have well above the earnings of the other Canadian-born. But 
until data are available to shed light on this possibility, an optimistic guess 
would be that these future generations of descendants of recent immigrants 
will be fully integrated into the Canadian economy and will have the same 
average incomes as other Canadians. Around this average will be those who 
are caught in the poverty trap that accompanies their parents’ low incomes, 
others will benefit from membership in their ancestors’ cultures that value 
education, hard work, entrepreneurship and savings, just as is the case with 
the income distribution of all Canadians. 
Labour shortages
One of the most widely used arguments in support of immigration is the 
need for workers to fill the jobs Canadians do not want or for which they are 
not trained. In our paper, we dealt with this alleged need for immigrants and 
concluded that it is built on shaky assumptions and that meeting it has an 
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important adverse consequence for Canada’s labour productivity and living 
standards.
Our analysis can be summarized briefly as follows. In the absence of 
immigrants filling job vacancies requiring special skills, wages would rise and 
attract Canadians to fill them. Importantly, these higher wages would induce 
employers to substitute capital and new technology to save on labour and 
allow employers to pay the higher wages without a loss of profits. Increased 
demand for unskilled workers would similarly induce employers to find cap-
ital and technologies to make do with the number of workers available. At the 
same time, the higher wages that the employers would be able to pay would 
induce more Canadians to join the labour force and thus increase the labour 
force participation rate.
The main advocates for more immigrants to fill job vacancies are 
Canadian employers. It is easy to understand their motivation. The immi-
grants keep wages down, which raises their profits and allows them to avoid 
the need to invest in the training of Canadian-born workers and labour sav-
ing capital and technology. 
There are two things wrong with immigration policies designed to meet 
the goals of employers. First, the benefits they derive exist only in the short 
run. As is the case with all government subsidies, competition from within 
and outside of Canada tends to wipe out all extra profits and can only delay 
adjustments required to accommodate changing global patterns of compara-
tive advantage.
Second, and most importantly, the implicit subsidies to employers 
occur at a significant cost to society as a whole. Because the subsidies pre-
vent the substitution of capital and technology for labour, there are lower 
productivity increases, which throughout history have been the driving force 
behind the growth in Canadian living standards. 
Finally, it is worth noting that the competition in the labour market 
from immigrants has some more subtle costs. Jobs taken by immigrants pre-
vent young Canadian-born students from entering prestigious, rewarding, 
and highly paid occupations that play important roles in our society such as 
doctors, engineers, and professors. The mechanism is straightforward. The 
availability of an excess supply of foreign professionals means that the gov-
ernment is not required to increase the number of places in universities for 
Canadians wanting to enter these fields. On the other end of the skills spec-
trum, immigrants with low skills drive down the earnings of the Canadians 
they compete with, including many Aboriginal Canadians.
J&P do not criticize the preceding analysis, but focus on the alleged 
inconsistency with our proposal that immigrants should be admitted only if 
they have an employment contract from a Canadian employer with pay at 
a specified minimum rate. They ask “why would Canadian employers have 
any incentive to offer jobs to foreigners to work in Canada?” (J&P, 2011: 40). 
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This criticism is unwarranted. Our analysis of the hidden cost of the 
current immigrant selection process is not designed to stop all immigration, 
but to avoid the fiscal burden it imposes on all Canadians, which is caused by 
the poor economic performance of recent immigrants and the characteristics 
of the welfare state. Under our proposal, immigrants with low skills and pay 
would be excluded and the labour market adjustments we analyzed would 
take place in response to the resultant job vacancies. However, workers with 
sufficient skills and pay would continue to immigrate. There would be no 
labour market shortages and the market adjustments would not take place. 
In our paper, we raised the concern that much of the present and 
future labour shortages are due to the immigrants who increase the demand 
for market goods and services and housing, along with the need to build and 
staff hospitals, schools, and infrastructure like roads and sanitation. 
This effect of immigrants on labour shortages may be illustrated by 
reference to the demand for and supply of physicians. At the present rate of 
about 250,000 new immigrants every year, in 10 years there will be 2.5 mil-
lion new Canadians demanding medical care. Since the average Canadian 
physician takes care of 470 patients, this demand translates into the need for 
5,329 additional physicians, which is added to the many needed to replace 
those who retire and to care for the increasing health care demands of an 
aging population.
An important public debate is taking place in Australia about the opti-
mum level of future immigration, which has produced a study that is directly 
relevant to our discussion of the labour shortages created by immigrants. 
Birrell et al. (2011), the authors of this study, summarized their findings as 
follows:  
 The case for higher migration partly rests on estimates of 
the number of skilled workers that employers require. The most 
widely quoted source on the scale of this need has been prepared by 
the government’s workforce advisory body, Skills Australia. It con-
cludes that, Australia will need an extra 2.4 million skilled workers 
by 2015 and an extra 5.2 million by 2025. Such enormous numbers 
cannot be achieved without very high net migration.
However, these forecasts were determined by the assump-
tions that the econometric modellers (Access Economics) were 
required to work with. These included that net overseas migration 
would grow from 220,000 in 2010 to 250,000 by 2025 and that 
Australia’s aggregate GDP would grow at nearly four per cent per 
annum over the period to 2025...In other words, the...projections 
are based on a circular argument, grounded on the assumptions 
fed into the model... (2011:ii)
The same circular argument is used to justify future high levels of immi-
gration in Canada: The immigrants needed to fill job vacancies are due to the 
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demand for labour created by the demand for goods and services and the need 
for housing and infrastructure projects caused by these same immigrants. 
While not all prospective labour shortages in Canada are due to projected 
rates of immigration, the preceding analysis implies that they would be much 
less if immigration were reduced. Such a reduction would almost certainly 
take place if our proposal for reform were adopted and resulted in not only 
reduced fiscal burdens, but also much fewer labour shortages.
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                    7  New immigrant selection criteria for 
Federal Skilled Workers (FSW)
After our earlier paper was in production, an important study by Begin, 
Goyette, and Riddell (2010) was presented that sheds light on the potential 
benefits of replacing the entire current immigrant selection process with the 
one we had proposed and which puts primary reliance on applicants holding 
a qualified job offer from a Canadian employer.12 This new paper drew on 
confidential data from Revenue Canada to estimate the average yearly earn-
ings for immigrant cohorts from the years 2000-2006 (see table 9).
The unique feature of this study and table is that it compares the earn-
ings of immigrants who had been selected using the criteria of the long used 
Federal Skilled Worker (FSW) selection system with the earnings of immi-
grants selected under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) 
of 2002. Because of its interpretation of a court decision, the government 
was required to admit applicants under the FSW system whose processing 
had not been completed in 2002, while at the same time, it began to admit 
applicants who were assessed under the new IRPA system. During the years 
2004-2006, there were income data for enough immigrants to make a mean-
ingful statistical comparison of average incomes of the two groups possible. 
These data are highlighted in table 9 and show that the new selection system 
(IRPA) brought immigrants with considerably higher incomes than the old 
system (FSW).13
Table 10 shows the weight given to the individual selection criteria used 
under the two systems. The most important and major changes involved gives 
more points for general education, language proficiency, and work experience; 
and reduced or eliminated those given for occupation and specific vocational 
preparation. 
Riddell (2010) summarized changes in the characteristics of the immi-
grants selected under the new criteria: 24 percent had either a Master’s degree 
 12  This paper was presented at a conference in Ottawa, the main findings of which are sum-
marized by Nadeau (2011).
 13  These results seem to be behind Minister Jason Kenney’s remarks to Peter O’Neil (2011) 
that “The most recent data I find really exciting indicates a significant turnaround in eco-
nomic results for immigrants in the past three years in particular.” However, the “past 
three years” refers to the period ending in 2006 before the 2008 financial crisis, which 
had a devastating impact on the labour market performance of recent immigrants as 
shown in table 1.
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Table 10: Old and New Selection Criteria Pre-and Post IRPA
Criteria Pre-IRPA Points 
(%)
Post IRPA Points 
(%)
Education
Ocial Language
Experience
SVP - specic 
vocational preparation
Arranged employment
Personal suitability
Adaptability
Relative in Canada
Occupation
Demographic Factor
Total 
Pass Mark
16 (14)
15 (13)
8 (7)
18 (16)
10 (9)
10 (9)
5 (4)
10 (9)
10
112
70
25
24
21
10
Under 
adaptability 5
100
75/67
Source: Begin et al. (2010), taken from Riddell website.
Table 9: Mean Employment Earnings
Selection Regime
Pre- IRPA 2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
Cohort 2000 20052004200320022001
IRPA 2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
Taxation Year
2006
17,500 33,000
15,300
36,400
26,800
13,200
38,600
31,900
25,700
13,100
42,000
36,000
31,500
24,300
12,600
45,400
40,100
36,300
30,600
24,300
11,700
49,600
44,600
41,600
36,500
31,300
21,600
11,500
26,200 40,600
24,300
48,800
34,000
32,600
53,300
40,600
40,100
27,800
58,800
46,200
47,500
37,600
28,700
Source:  Begin et al. (2010), taken from Riddell website.
Table 9: Mean employment earnings
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or a Ph.D. under pre-IRPA, versus 41 percent under IRPA; 24 percent of 
pre-IRPA arrivals reported not knowing either French or English upon land-
ing, versus 4 percent under IRPA; source countries for the top 5 countries 
accounted for 57 percent pre-IRPA and 40 percent under IRPA—China 
dropped from 29 percent to 16 percent of the total IRPA flow; top 5 occu-
pations accounted for 81 percent pre-IRPA, but are 67 percent under IRPA; 
professionals in natural and applied sciences dropped from 60 percent pre-
IRPA to 29 percent under IRPA, of those from China dropped from 24 per-
cent of total pre-IRPA flow to 6 percent under IRPA; 2004 and 2005 arrival 
cohorts selected under IRPA regime had higher employment rates than those 
selected under pre-IRPA regime.
Most important for the assessment of our proposal for granting immi-
grant visas is the analysis of the earnings of immigrants under the two regimes, 
where the earnings were adjusted for the province of the immigrants’ resi-
dence. The following is a quote from Riddell (2010):
The earnings of IRPA arrivals are most significantly affected by:
1. Arranged Employment Offer (AEO): 
•	 Increases employment earnings by 74% on the  
  landing  year;
•	 The gap decreases by 9% every subsequent year; 
2. Language points: 
•	 The effect peaks for those who have obtained between     
  16-20 points, which correspond to 38% to 39% higher  
  earnings; 
3. Previous work experience in Canada:
•	 Increases employment earnings by 27%...
Other factors that positively affect employment earnings: 
•	 Age 
•	 Education 
•	 Work experience 
•	 Partner’s education
     (Riddell, 2010: slides 33, 34)
These results suggest to us that the current immigrant selection sys-
tem could be simplified and made more efficient by relying exclusively on 
applicants’ holding pre-arranged employment offers, as we had suggested in 
our original paper. As the data show, language proficiency, work experience, 
as well as desirable levels of age and education, all contribute to the likely 
success of immigrants who have not benefitted from arranged employment 
offers. It is exactly these characteristics, which are used by employers when 
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offering jobs to applicants and those who possess them would therefore be 
able to obtain such offers.
In this context it is worth remembering that under our proposal for a 
system that relies entirely on immigrants’ holding job offers, the immediate 
family of successful applicants would be admitted simultaneously and would 
be eligible for finding employment in Canada on their own. 
However, even if the selection is greatly improved for FSWs under the 
new system, it would still not deal with the problem of the poor performance 
of family class immigrants, mainly parents and grandparents, but also other 
siblings. Under our proposal, immigrants in this class would no longer be 
allowed to come to Canada unless they could also meet the new selection cri-
teria or their relatives in Canada post a bond with a trustee bank, which would 
have been used to pay for all expected future medical and economic needs. 
The implementation of this policy would not change existing practi-
ces fundamentally since the offspring of parents and grandparents living in 
Canada already have to sponsor them by pledging that they will pay for all 
the expected future medical and economic needs of their parents and grand-
parents. The problem with the existing system is that these pledges are often 
not met and government enforcement is lax because the offspring often are 
financially unable to meet their obligation and fines Thus, our proposed policy 
in principle merely ensures that pledges of financial support are indeed met. 
Another recent study that supports the critical contribution that a job 
offer can make to the success of immigrants in labour markets is MacDonald, 
Warman, and Worswick (2011). They examine the process of immigrant selec-
tion and occupational outcomes of International Medical Graduates (IMGs) 
in the US and Canada. The main difference in immigrant selection between 
these two countries is that Canada utilizes a point system and the United 
States choses IMGs through employer nomination. Their main finding is 
that “In Canada, IMGs are less likely to be employed as a physician than 
are IMGs in the US and a large percentage of the IMGs in Canada either 
find work in lower skill occupations or are not employed.” (MacDonald et al, 
2011: i). Concerning this result, they observe that “credential recognition by 
employers may ensure that the international medical graduate (IMG) who 
becomes a resident of the US is much more likely to be able to find suitable 
employment given his/her training [than the one who becomes a resident in 
Canada].” (MacDonald et al, 2011: 34).
The selection systems used to admit immigrants qualifying as business 
class immigrants, refugees, and live-in caregivers are not covered by our pro-
posal and should be examined as part of a more general overhaul of Canada’s 
current immigrant selection system and would also need to be tightened. 
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                    8  Summary and conclusions
Mohsen Javdani and Krishna Pendakur challenged the findings of our study 
that the present system for the selection of immigrants in Canada has admit-
ted a cohort of immigrants from 1987-2004 that imposed a fiscal burden on 
other Canadians valued at more than $6,000 per immigrant about $16 billion 
in 2006 and about $23 billion in 2011.
The challengers estimated that instead the fiscal burden in 2005/6 was 
only $450 per immigrant, based on the average incomes and tax payments 
by an immigrant cohort from 1970-2004 and on an unwarranted speculative 
downward adjustment for public goods. They justified the use of the 1970-
2004 cohort by claiming that the smaller cohort used by us underestimates 
the true earnings of immigrants since the immigrants included were younger 
and had not reached their full earnings capacity.
This paper reviews the mounting evidence that the recent immigrants 
in the 1987-2004 cohort had a significantly lower degree of economic success 
than did immigrants who had arrived before, mainly because their numbers 
were substantially larger and invariant to economic cycles and they had been 
selected by applying more aggressively several important new selection poli-
cies that had been adopted in the preceding decade.
The paper also presents newly available evidence showing that the 
income gap between recent immigrants and Canadians has been increasing 
in comparisons of the two groups with the same gender, education, work 
experience, and, importantly, age. In other words, the lower incomes and 
tax payments of recent immigrants relative to those of Canadians are likely 
to exist over all stages of their lives, which invalidates the criticism of our 
estimates made by J&P. 
After taking the opportunity to correct some minor errors in our ori-
ginal study and using a different base for the comparison of the incomes of 
other Canadians and immigrants, our revised estimate of the fiscal burden 
is virtually unchanged from that found in the original paper that was criti-
cized by J&P.
Javdani and Pendakur presented some additional theoretical and 
empirical arguments that resulted in the lower estimate of the fiscal burden 
they presented which claimed that the burden was reduced by the existence 
of non-measurable benefits brought by immigrants. The present paper ana-
lyzed these arguments carefully and found them wanting. 
In particular, it rejected the argument that taxes paid by immigrants 
lowered the cost of pure public goods for other Canadians without reducing 
the benefits they provide. This benefit exists only in the short run, as for 
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example, spending on defence in the longer run is mainly a function of 
national income that is determined in part by immigration. In addition, the 
large numbers of immigrants in recent years have increased the cost of deliv-
ery of health care, education, and welfare for other Canadians through crowd-
ing and special needs, which is not reflected in our estimates of the fiscal 
burden imposed by recent immigrants and is entirely ignored by J&P.
The paper also introduces new data from Statistics Canada that shows 
that second-generation immigrants, the children of immigrants in Canada, on 
average have lower incomes than other Canadians for every level of educa-
tion. This casts serious doubt on the conjecture by J&P that the fiscal burdens 
imposed by the current generation of immigrants will be repaid by their 
offspring. 
The paper concludes with the presentation of new evidence suggesting 
that Federal Skilled Worker immigrants who were admitted on the basis of 
pre-arranged employment offers had much higher incomes than comparable 
immigrants admitted under previously existing criteria. This evidence implies 
that our reform proposals for the exclusive use of such job offers would result 
in a significant decrease, if not elimination, of the fiscal burden that exists 
under the present selection system.
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